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by Lawrence W. Waggoner and John H. Langbein
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the

Will
\

lthough it has been axiomatic that
our courts do not entertain suits to
reform wills on the ground of
mistake, appellate courts in New
York, Michigan, New Jersey, and
California have decided cases
within the last several years that may presage the
abandonment of the ancient "no-reformation"
rule. (In re Snide, 52 N.Y.2d 193, 418 N.E.2d 656,
437 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1981); Estate of Krernlick, 331
N.W.2d 228 (Mich. 1983); En Ie v . Sie el, 74 N.J.
287, 377 A.2d 892 (1977); an Estate ofTaff, 63
Cal. App. 3d 319, 133 Cal.Rptr. 737 (1976).)

d

The new cases do not purport to make this fundamental doctrinal change, although the New York
court did announce an explicit exception to the noreformation rule and the other three courts did disclaim a related rule, sometimes called the "plain
meaning" rule. That rule, which we will be calling
the "no-extrinsic-evidence rule," prescribes that
courts not receive evidence about the testator's intent
apart from, or in opposition to, the legal effect of
the language he uses in the will itself. The three
courts said that they were consulting extrinsic evidence (in the California and New Jersey cases,
primarily the testimony of the lawyers whose poor
draftsmanship had led to the litigation) in order to
engage in "construction" of supposedly ambiguous
instruments.
In this article, which both summarizes and updates
an extensively footnoted article published last year
("Reformation of Wills on the Ground of Mistake:
Change of Direction in American Law?" 130 University of Pennsylvania Law Rmiew 521 (1982)), we report
on this new case law and discuss the analytic framework that we think it suggests and requires.

We shall discuss the three purported construction
cases first and then turn to the more candid New
York precedent.
The will in the Krernlick case devised half the testator's residuary estate "to the Michigan Cancer
Society." Although there was an organization of that
name, the Michigan Supreme Court, in a brief opinion, allowed another organization (the American
Cancer Society, Michigan Division) to have a trial on
the question of which was actually the intended beneficiary. The issue on remand, therefore, will be
whether to prefer extrinsic evidence of the testator's
intent over the explicit language of his will.
In Engle v . Siege1 the two testators, spouses, named
their children as their residuary devisees; in the

event the children predeceased them, each estate was
to pass equally to the spouses' mothers. The spouses
and children died in a hotel fire, predeceased, however, by one of the two spouses' mothers. Under the
routine constructional law of the jurisdiction, the surviving mother would have taken the entirety of the
two estates, since she was the sole surviving residuary devisee. The heirs of the predeceased mother
contested and won. Extrinsic evidence of the spouses'
deliberations with their lawyer at the time of the
drafting of their wills showed that they had inclined
to name their respective families as contingent residuary devisees, and that they had chosen to name
the two mothers only after the lawyer had pointed
out that the word "family" was imprecise. The New
Jersey Supreme Court said:
We have no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the
primary wish of each decedent, given the contingency
that occurred, would have been to divide the property
included in their residuary estates between the [families of
the two mothers]. The designation of their respective mothers resulted solely from the scrivener's rejection of the word
"family" as a term to describe the recipient of a testamentary benefaction. Each mother was obviously thought of as
an appropriate representative of a "family."

Extrinsic evidence was thereby used to contradict the
language of the wills.
The testatrix in Taff devised the residue of her
estate to her sister Margaret, or if Margaret predeceased her (which was the contingency that in fact
occurred), "to my heirs in accordance with the laws
of intestate succession. . . ." Her residuanr estate
consisted of community property to which she had
succeeded by virtue of its community character on
the death of her husband. The California probate
code provided that in the event such property passed
by intestacy, it should descend in equal halves to
the heirs of the predeceased spouse and of the decedent. Accordingly, the effect of the language in the
will adopting the heirship definition of the intestacy
statute would have been-if applied-to pass half
of her property to the heirs of her late husband, and
half to her natural heirs (who were at her death some
nieces and a nephew). In the trial court, the
testatrix's natural heirs claimed the entire estate, on
the ground that she meant to designate only them. In
order to prove her actual intent, her natural heirs
offered the testimony of her lawyer, who testified
that she had instructed him to draft her will so that
the residue went "to her own family, her own blood
relatives." The intermediate court of appeals followed
the trial court and sustained the claim of the
testatrix's natural heirs to take the entire estate.
As in the Michigan and New Jersey cases, the key
departure in Tuff was the court's expansive treatment
of the purpose for which it would consider evidence
contradicting the terms of the will. In a statement
that significantly breaks from prior law while seeming to invoke it, the court declared: "Extrinsic

evidence was properly received both to create the
ambiguity in the word 'heirs' and to resolve the
ambiguity." This way of stating the matter obliterates
the fundamental distinction between ambiguity and
mistake. The disputed term in Taff that had been
mistakenly employed was quite unambiguous. The
effect of the decision in Taff was to substitute a
phrase such as "my natural heirs" for the inapt
phrase that the will had employed ("my heirs in
accordance with the laws of intestate succession") in
order to carry out what the court conceived to be
the actual or subjective intent of the testatrix.
In each of these cases-Kremlick, Engle v. Siegel
and Tuff-the wills were utterly unambiguous. What
each court actually did was to allow extrinsic evidence of the testator's intent to be preferred over the
contrary but mistaken language in the wdl.
In the New York case, I n re Snide, the New York
Court of Appeals had to face one of the recurrent
mistake situations: Husband and wife each signed a
will prepared for the other, and only after the death
of the husband was it discovered that he signed the
wrong will. Harvey Snide signed the will prepared
for his wife Rose, on account of the error of the lawyer-draftsman who supervised the joint execution
ceremony. The first-instance court brushed aside the
argument that strict compliance with the Wills Act
prevented remedy for "a mistake so obvious." The
court granted an application to reform the will, ordering that the words "Harvey," "Rose," and "wife" be
substituted for "Rose," "Harvey," and "husband,"
respectively.
The first-instance court in Snide reached its result
on general equitable principles, apparently without
having understood that in the law of wills reformation has been refused even for "a mistake so
obvious." The intermediate appellate court reversed
in a memorandum opinion limited to pointing out
that the judgment below ignored contrary New York
appellate authority. In 1981, the New York Court of
Appeals in tum reversed the appellate division and
sustained the power of the first-instance court to
reform the will. Unlike the courts in Kremlick,
Engle v. Siegel, and Taff, the New York court admitted
that it was granting reformation of a w d , and it recognized how strongly that step contravened the former
law. Nevertheless, the court advanced no significant
justification for its departure. Its main concern was to
limit its decision to this "very unusual case." The
factors that the court mentioned in order to justify
making the exception are factors that could (and in
the view we develop below, should) be decisive in
other cases of supposed mistake: (1)the high quality
of the evidence of the mistake, and (2) the irnportance of serving the underlying policy of the Wills
Act, which is to implement the testator's true intent.
We think that the "mere exception" rubric of Snide
is ultimately no more defensible than the "mere construction" theory in Kremlick, Engle v . Siegel, and
Taff. The Snide case is, however, a milestone on the

path toward a general reformation doctrine, because
an Anglo-American court has now expressly acted
to grant reformation of a will on the ground of
mistake.
The inclination of modem courts to prevent injustice despite a long tradition of refusing to remedy
mistakes in wills is, in our view, laudable. We do
not, however, believe that courts should continue to
reach such results by doctrinal sleight-of-hand.
Rather, we take the position that the time has come
for forthright judicial reconsideration of the no-reformation rule. We believe that a reformation doctrine
shaped and limited according to criteria that we
identify below has the capacity to prevent much of
the hardship associated with the former rule, while
effectively dealing with the concerns that motivated
the rule.

The C o n t r u t w&h Nonprobate Tramferd:
The Ev2entiary Policy
The no-reformation rule is peculiar to the law of
wdls. It does not apply to other modes of gratuitous
transfer-the so-called nonprobate transfers-even
though many are virtually indistinguishable from the
will in function. Reformation lies routinely to correct
mistakes, both of expression and of omission, in
deeds of gift, inter vivos trusts, life insurance contracts, and other instruments that serve to transfer
wealth to donees upon the transferor's death.
Courks have been willing to use their equity powers in these nonprobate situations, because a case
of well-proven mistake necessarily invokes the fundamental principle of the law of restitution: preventing
unjust enrichment. If the mistake is not corrected, the
mistaken beneficiary is unjustly enriched at the
expense of the intended beneficiary.
Judicial intervention to prevent unjust enrichment
has such a manifestly compelling doctrinal basis that
the puzzle is to explain why the courts have not been
willing to act similarly when the document affected
by the mistake is a will. Unjust enrichment is equally
wrong whether the resulting error occurs in an inter
vivos transfer or in a will. Both transfers are gratuitous, both unilateral. Accordingly, we emphasize as a
starting point that the no-reformation rule for wills
cannot rest on the notion that there is no wrong to
remedy. Why, then, does equity refuse to remedy
unjust enrichment in the case of a mistaken will?
The customary justification has to do with the
nature of the evidence in cases of testation. Evidence
suggesting that the document is affected by
mistake-that the will is at variance with the testator's actual intent-must necessarily be presented
when death has placed the testator beyond reply. The

testimony will typically involve statements allegedly
made by the testator, so-called direct declarations
of intent, which he can now neither corroborate nor
deny. The testator's main protection against fabricated or mistaken evidence is the will itself.
Therefore, it has been argued, evidence extrinsic to
the will should be excluded; and if the extrinsic evidence is excluded, the court can not learn of the
ground upon which the reformation claim rests.
The law of nonprobate transfers supplies two persuasive answers. First, although the living donor
under an inter vivos instrument can take the stand
and test* about his true intent, this testimony does
not have automatic reliability. The donor's testimony
doubtless reflects his current intent, but the matter
in issue is his intent at the time the instrument was
executed. The instrument may have stated this intent
accurately; he may since have changed his mind and
now be lying or deceiving himself, or he may be
mistaken about what he originally intended. Consequently, even the donor's own testimony is properly
regarded as inherently suspect, which is why even
such testimony is put to the clear-and-convincingevidence test.
Second, and still more telling, reformation of documents effecting gratuitous inter vivos transfers is
routinely granted even after the death of the donor.
In these cases the extrinsic evidence is inherently
suspect for exactly the reason that evidence of a testator's intent is suspect when offered against a will.
Nevertheless, in nonprobate transfers when the clearand-convincing-evidence standard has been satisfied,
clauses omitted by mistake have been inserted. The
courts have corrected mistaken designations of the
beneficiaries, of the property intended to have been
the subject matter of the gift, and of the extent of the
interest intended to have been granted to the beneficiary. Documents drafted by lawyers (or others) have
not been distinguished from self-drawn documents;
enrichment of an unintended donee at the expense of
the intended donee is unjust whether the mistake
has been made by the donor or by his lawyer. The
essential safeguard in these cases has been the dearand-convincing-evidence standard, which appellate
courts have policed rigorously.
Accordingly, we believe that the evidentiary problem, although important, does not in fact explain or
justify the no-reformation rule in matters of testamentary mistake. If the courts had not been deeply
worried about another policy, namely, compliance
with Wills Act formality, we think that they would
long ago have followed the evidentiary practice of
nonprobate transfers for dealing with claims of mistake regarding wills. Instead of excluding the
evidence, and thereby foreclosing any chance of
proving the mistake, the courts would have dealt
with the potential unreliability of the evidence by
admitting it and testing it against the higher-thanordinary standard of proof that has worked so well in
the law of nonprobate transfers.

Unaerdtan2ing the No-Reformation Rule:
The Unattedtea Language Problem
The great obstacle to reformation in the law of
wills has been remedial rather than evidentiarv. The
real problem has not been proving the mistaki with
adequate certainty, but remedying it in a fashion
consistent with the requirements of Wills Act formality. When the particular mistake that has affected a
will is one that would require a court to supply an
omitted term or to substitute language outside the
will in dace of a mistaken term, the obiection arises
that the' language to be supplied was nAt written,
signed, and attested as required by the Wills Act.
Reformation would amear to have the courts interpolating unattested language into will.
In our article in the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review, we have pointed to a variety of settings
where practice in-the traditional law of testamentan
mistake shows that the courts are less serious about
the evidentiary problem than they are about the
vroblem of technical Wills Act com~liance.When a
mistake can be corrected by means of a theory that
does not appear to conflict with the Wills Act, existt extrinsic evidence to be
ine" doctrines ~ e r m i the
admitted in order to prove the mistake. The courts
purport to fear the potential unreliability of extrinsic
evidence when they exclude it, yet they admit extrinsic evidence in the-contexts in which it is equally
unreliable. Where the courts have been able to remedy mistakes, they have manipulated notions of
construction in G o ways: primarily by refusing effect
to mistaken but attested language, but occasionally
by conferring the imprimatur of attestation upon
unattested language, that is, language not contained
in the will.
It is essential to understand that the unattested
language problem raises a technical or formal rather
than a purposive question. The purpose of having all
the terms of a will attested is evidentiary, which is
why it is so important that the courts have shown
themselves able to deal effectively with the concern
about the quality of the proofs in the fraction of mistake cases that are now remediable. Accordingly,
we believe that the primary impediment to the adoption of a general reformation doctrine for wills has
been the seeming need for technical adherence to the
Wdls Act, rather than any judgment that it would
offend the underlying purpose of the Wills Act to
remedy well-proven mistakes. That, in turn, throws
light on why the no-reformation rule has produced
results so harsh. In countless cases of palpable mistake, the courts have felt obliged to enforce the Wills
Act literally even though it is manifest that to do so
defeats the basic goal of the Wills Act, which is to
implement the testator's intent.
As indicated above, the primary way that courts
manipulate notions of construction to correct a misI I

take without appearing to conflict with the Wills Act
is by refusing effect to mistaken but attested language. This maneuver is possible in cases of
ambiguity. Situations involving ambiguous expression constitute a significant fraction of the mistakes
that occur in wills, and even under traditional law,
mistakes of this type are remediable in will construction suits. Ironically, therefore, the availability of
remedy for this kind of mistake has played a role in
keeping the no-reformation rule in force by reducing
the pressure to reexamine it.
The ambiguity doctrine has two basic elements: (1)
where the will contains an ambiguity, extrinsic evidence is admissible to clarify it; and (2) if necessary,
mistaken parts of a will may be disregarded in order
to give effect to intention proved by extrinsic evidence. The leading American decision enunciating
these principles is Patch v . White, 117 U.S. 210 (1886),
decided by a sharply divided United States Supreme
Court in 1886. The testator's will devised to his
brother a parcel of land described as "lot numbered
six, in square four hundred and three, together with
the improvements thereon erected and appurtenances
thereto belonging-being a lot which belongs to me,
and not specifically devised to any other person in
this my will." Extrinsic evidence revealed a latent
ambiguity: There was a conflict between the description contained in the will and the subject matter of
the gift. Although there was a square 403, and it
contained a lot number 6, the testator did not (and
never did) own that lot and there were no improvements on it. The Court then repeated a maxim that
still appears in the decisions. "It is settled doctrine,"
the Court said, "that as a latent ambiguity is only
disclosed by extrinsic evidence it may be removed by
extrinsic evidence." The extrinsic evidence showed
that the testator did own lot number 3, in square 406,
and that this lot had not been specifically devised
and was improved with a dwelling house. The Court
found that the testator intended to devise this lot 3
to his brother, and that his intent could be given
effect by "striking out the false description." In effect,
the Court treated the testator's will as though it
devised "lot number [blank], in square four hundred
and [blank]. . . ." The Court the found that other
evidence sufficed to establish the correct lot and
square numbers: Lot 3 in square 406 was the only
one the testator owned in a square whose number
commenced with four hundred and that was not otherwise specifically disposed of in his will. The Court
analogized this process of construction to the construction of words "blurred by accident so as to be
illegible"; cases in which words have been judicially
striken or disregarded because of mistake, the Court
concluded, should be resolved in the same way.
The process employed in Patch v . White has been
routinely applied to descriptions of devisees as well
as property. At present, therefore, if an ambiguity is
found to exist, courts are prepared to admit just that
sort of extrinsic evidence of the testator's intent

(including his direct declarations) that would have to
be admitted if a general reformation doctrine for wdls
were to be adopted.
Why is it that the admissibility of such evidence is
conditioned on the appearance of a so-called ambiguity? We infer that it is not the quality of the evidence
but the availability of a theory of remedy that
explains the courts' willingness to correct mistakes
that can be characterized as resulting in ambiguity.
The great attraction of the ambiguity label is that
it virtually assures that a court can effect a remedy
within the confines of the Wills Act. Ambiguity
invokes the theory of construction rather than of reformation. When a court "construes" attested
language, it "discovers" what the "ambiguous"
words of the will "really" mean, whereas when a
court reforms an instrument, it forthrightly supplies
language from without. Although in truth the court
in Patch v. White supplied omitted lot and section
numbers, the ambiguity rubric permitted it to say
that it was construing words within the will.
Courts do not openly discuss why the Wills Act is
seen as allowing attested language to be stricken
while not allowing unattested language to be
inserted. We suspect that the underlying notion is
that attested but mistaken language lacks testamentary intent. It is well accepted that a wdl executed
wholly by mistake is invalid, on the ground that it
lacks testamentary intent. In Patch v . White, when
"lot 6 of square 403" was effectively rendered as "lot
[blank] of square [blank]," the court was determining
that the misdescriptions lacked testamentary intent
and could be disregarded. In effect, Patch v . White
involved partial denial of probate for want of testamentary intent. If the courts were not so frightened
of the Wills Act, they would not meander in cases
like Patch v. White. The device of striking out and
then construing the resulting blanks is sufficiently
awkward (by comparison with reformation) that it
leaves little room for doubt about why it is done: It
gives the appearance of Wills Act compliance. There
are a variety of other doctrines in which reformationlike results are achieved by construction tricks. These
indude the dependent relative revocation rule, which
corrects mistakes by implying remedies as conditions, and the personal usage doctrine, which saves
some instruments containing seeming misnomers.
In addition to the ambiguity-striking out cases,
courts have found other ways to correct mistakes
without appearing to conflict with the Wills Act.
Occasionally, the courts confer the imprimatur of
attestation upon unattested language, for example, by
the technique of implying future interests. Among
the recurrent situations that have given rise to an
implied future interest is the dispositive plan "To A
for life, then to B if A dies without issue." If A dies
with issue, a remainder in favor of such issue has
been implied on the ground that the import of the
condition attached to B's remainder makes it highly
probable that the testator's primary objective was

to benefit A's issue if A left any. In this and other
appropriate situations, courts "construct" omitted
provisions out of the so-called general dispositive
plan of the testator; the idea that words can be
inserted into a will in this way is widely accepted.
The Wills Act is not seen as posing an obstacle to
this process because the inserted words are deemed
to be constructed out of, or implied from, the attested
words. The inserted words are thus seen as having
the imprimatur of attestation.
Finally, we may point out that there are special
types of mistakes that some courts have been willing
to correct by openly reforming wills. An early decision of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire
adopted a reformation doctrine for perpetuity violations, and this has been followed by the Supreme
Courts of Hawaii, Mississippi, and West Virginia.
See generally, Waggoner, "Perpetuity Reform," 81
Mich. L.Rev. 1718, 1755-1759 (1983). These courts
were preoccupied with the problems of perpetuity
law, and did not explain how their results could be
squared with the no-reformation rule in the law of
wills. Courts have also openly reformed wills in one
type of tax case, a recent example of which is Estate
of Burdon-Miller, 456 A.2d 1266 (Me. 1983). The Internal Revenue Code, section 2055(e)(3), grants an estate
tax charitable deduction for certain charitable remainder trusts, if they have been created by wills that
were executed prior to a certain date and if, after the
testator's death, they were "amended or conformed"
to the charitable remainder trust requirements as a
result of judicial proceedings begun prior to a certain
date. The state courts seem to have taken this federal
statutory provision as somehow overriding the state
Wills Act, so as to authorize the insertion of unattested language into wills. Elsewhere in the tax cases
we find instances in which courts, mainly through
doctrinal sleight-of-hand, have in effect reformed
wills-without conceding that they were doing soin order to conform testamentary provisions with
such tax requirements as those applicable to the marital deduction.

Overcom'ng

the ProbCern of

Unattwtea Language
The no-reformation rule rests on the view that the
courts cannot supply missing language, because the
language to be supplied has not been written down,
signed, and attested as required by the Wills Act.
Reformation would require the validation of unattested language. The recent cases, described earlier,
sidestepped the unattested language problem by
manipulating the construction process or, in the case
of Snide, by establishing an "exception" deemed by

the court to be too narrow to call the underlying noreformation rule into question.
We propose to dispute the argument that the Wills
Act attestation requirements dictate the no-reformation rule. In the following section we point the way
to a theory that would allow reformation to confer the
imprimatur of compliance upon language that must
be supplied in order to remedy a mistaken omission
or to correct a mistaken term in a will that has been
otherwise executed in compliance with the formal
requirements of the Wills Act. This compliance-type
theory is derived from the practice of the courts in
the most analogous area of private law, namely, cases
in which language has been mistakenly omitted from
or mistakenlv rendered in an instrument that must
comply with the formal requirements of the Statute of
Frauds.
We then discuss a second theorv. also with an
ample common law pedigree, that could be employed
in many mistake cases in order to overcome the unattested language problem. We call this theory
"remedying wrongdoing"; we derive it from the
quite similar notion that has been developed in constructive trust cases. Where the mistake that has
affected the will has been the product of a wrong, for
example the negligence of the lawyer-draftsman, the
constructive trust cases provide by way of analogy an
independent basis for reformation: preventing harm
to the innocent victim of third-party wrongdoing.
.I'

Cot7zpliat.zce Theory: AnalogLnhg from Practice
uni'er the Statute of F r a ~ d ~
The no-reformation rule has been justified on the
ground that a contrary practice would allow oral wills
in violation of the Wills Act attestation requirements.
So also the so-called "oral contract" argument has
been made respecting the Statute of Frauds. The stattb be violated when oral evidence is
ute is argued
"
adduced to show that an instrument subject to the
Statute contains a mistaken term or lacks a term that
was intended.
In his notable article, "Reformation and the Statute
of Frauds," 65 Mich. L.Rev. 421 (1967), George Palmer showed why the "oral contract" argument was
fallacious and not a barrier to reformini
" the instrument. The parties' attempt to express their
transaction in writing is also an attempt to express in
writing" the deficient or omitted term. From the
standpoint of the purposes of the formal requirements of the Statute of Frauds, there is a considerable
difference between noncompliance and defective
compliance. The cautionarfand evidentiary purposes
of the Statute of Frauds are largely achieved in the
attempt at due execution. The object of reformation
in these cases is not to enforce an oral transaction but
to make a written transaction conform to the true
understanding of the parties. "To say that reformation amounts to enforcement of the oral agreement,"

Palmer argued, "overlooks the significance of . . . the
act of the parties by which they sought to tum the
oral understanding into a legally enforceable agreement through expression in the writing. In the view
of most judges, equity performs a proper role when
it corrects the consequences of mistake so as to make
the situation correspond, not merely to what the parties intended, but to what they also attempted to
effectuate."
The safeguard that prevents reformation from
being abused, for example, by being employed to
interpolate a spurious term, is the ancient requirement of an exceptionally high standard of proof in
reformation cases. Palmer's conclusion, for which he
adduces considerable support in the case law, is that
the Statute of Frauds "should not prevent reformation
in any case in which it is found by clear and convincing evidence that through mistake a writing fails
to express the terms [that] the parties to an agreement intended to express in the writing."
In a companion article, "Reformation and the Par01
Evidence Rule." 65 Mich. L.Rev. 833 (1967),
, Palmer
demonstrated that the parol evidence'rule, properly
understood, does not hinder the trier from consulting
extrinsic evidence in these cases. Following Wigmore, Corbin, and much modem authority, Palmer
showed that the so-called integration doctrine limits
application of the parol evidence rule to cases in
which "the writing was intended to be a complete
and accurate embodiment of the agreement." Hence,
"[tlhe parol evidence rule of itself is never an obstacle to reformation, provided there is satisfactory
evidence of a mistake in integration." Once again, it
is the heavy burden of proof according to a clearand-convincing-evidence
reauirement that is the real
"
safeguard against fraud and other abuse, rather than
the categorical denial of relief.
We think that Palmer's analysis applies with f d
cogency to the Wills Act. Transposed to the setting of
the Wills Act, Palmer's analysis highlights the difference between an oral will and the use of oral or other
extrinsic evidence in order to correct or to supply a
term in a duly executed will. Whereas an oral will
instances total noncompliance with the Wills Act
formalities, a duly executed will with a mistakenly
rendered term involves high levels of compliance
with both the letter and the pumose of the Wills Act
formalities. To the extent that a mistake case risks
impairing any policy of the Wills Act, it is the evidentiary policy that is in question. But, as Palmer
points out, the decisive feature of the law of reformation in the inter vivos transfer cases has been its
alternative evidentiary safeguard, the requirement of
an exceptionally high standard of proof. A modern
reformation doctrine for the law of wills will certainly
adhere to this clear-and-convincing-evidence
standard.
A substantially identical analysis appeared in 1973
in a report to the Lord Chancellor by England's official Law Reform Committee. The Committee found
,

L

A

itself unable to identlfy tenable reasons "why the
equitable doctrine of rectification [the English term
for reformation] does not apply to wills." It dismissed the unattested language argument on the
ground that "in the case of other documents the doctrine of rectification applies even though statute
requires them to be in a particular form, for example,
under seal; and evidence of what words a will was
intended to contain may fall far short of general evidence of the testator's dispositive intention." In other
words, relief against mistake does not augur the
enforcement of oral wills. Courts do and should distinguish between noncompliance with formal
requirements and the extensive compliance characteristic of mistake cases. The Committee also echoed
Palmer in trusting for safeguard to the higher standard of proof already developed in the law of
rectification for inter vivos instuments.

Rem&ing Wrong2ohg: Enforchg Unattedte2
Intention in Open Drjregar2 of the W& Act.
In mistake cases, the testator has typically sought
out, paid for, and relied upon the work of counsel.
To frustrate the wishes of a testator who had the
prudence to follow counsel's direction seems especially offensive if it is avoidable. Since testators
cannot be expected to discover their lawyers' mistakes, the question is whether to charge them with
such mistakes when the evidence clearly establishes
what was really wanted. We think it palpable that
in these circumstances the testator's intent should be
implemented if it can be proved with appropriate
certainty.
It is well established that when a devisee or an
heir commits a wrong-by fraud, undue influence,
or duress-in procuring his devise or in preventing
disinheritance, a court of equity w d prevent the
wrongdoer from benefiting. Further, when the act of
wrongdoing deprives an intended beneficiary of a
devise or an inheritance, the court can impose a constructive trust in his favor.
The willingness of the courts to intervene in these
cases invites comparison with the two policies on
which the general no-reformation rule rests: the
potential unreliability of the extrinsic evidence and
the need for adherence to Wills Act formality.
When a will is alleged to have been affected by
wrongdoing, both the fact of the wrongful act and
the identity of the wrongfully deprived beneficiary
must be proved by extrinsic evidence. This evidence
is of the same character and inherent untrustworthiness as the evidence that would be required under
a general reformation doctrine of the sort we
advocate.
When a constructive trust is imposed on a wrongdoer, and when it is imposed in favor of the
intended and wrongfully deprived beneficiary, the
courts are ordering that the decedent's property be

transferred to a person who was not designated to
take it in a validly executed will. In order to appreciate the significance of this, it is important to observe
that the policy against preventing a wrongdoer from
profiting by his own wrong could be served in a
more limited way that would be much more faithful
to the supposed virtue of Wills Act obeisance. Rather
than impose the constructive trust for the benefit of
the intended beneficiary who was not named in the
will, the courts could impose the constructive trust
for the benefit of the testator's estate, coupled with
the direction that the estate pass as though the
wrongdoer had predeceased the testator and the
wrongdoer's interest in the estate had lapsed. Under
such a decree, the estate would pass entirely to the
remaining beneficiaries (the innocent devisees named
in the will, or in the event of partial or total intestacy, the innocent heirs). The court's only tampering
with the attested instrument would be by way of
deletion, on the familiar ground that a nominal
devise tainted by wrongdoer's conduct lacks testamentary intent.
Why have the courts not followed this less adventurous path, which we might call the "mere deletion"
approach? The answer, which is well understood in
the case law and the literature, is that mere deletion
would still leave unjust enrichment unremedied.
Although it would effectively deny the wrongdoer his
spoils, it would allow his wrongful act to result in a
benefit for the remaining innocent beneficiaries at
the expense of the intended beneficiary. The courts
have preferred the rule that a constructive trust action
lies even against innocent beneficiaries, in order that
they not be unjustly enriched at the expense of the
intended beneficiary on account of the wrongdoer's
conduct.
Accordingly, it is safe to say that in the constructive trust cases the courts have determined that the
policy of correcting unjust enrichment resulting from
wrongdoing prevails against the policy of literal
adherence to Wills Act formality. If this principle
were extended from the cases of intentional wrongdoing, where it is now entrenched, to cases of
negligent wrongdoing, it could supply the theory for
relief in many of the most egregious mistake cases
that under traditional law go unremedied.
We think that the "remedying-wrongdoing" rationale in the constructive trust cases should apply to
those mistake cases in which the mistake results from
the poor draftsmanship of a lawyer (or other scrivener), as in cases like Taff and Engle v. Siegel; or from
negligent supervision of clerical work, or of the execution process as in cases like Snide. The courts have
shown themselves able to overcome the evidentiary
difficulties in the constructive trust cases. If the lawyer's wrong in a mistake case is not corrected, an
unintended beneficiary is unjustly enriched at the
expense of the intended taker. To be sure, the constructive trust cases that arise in circumstances of
fraud and force can be distinguished, because the

lawyer's wrongful conduct in the mistake case is negligent rather than intentional; but the distinction
between intentional and negligent wrongdoing seems
misplaced as a ground for denying relief in these
mistake cases. A wrong is a wrong; and in the mistake cases the testator's claim is more worthy of relief
than in most of the cases where remedy is now
granted, because the testator sought out and followed
the advice of counsel.

The Reformation Doctrine
The iGpulse to relieve against mistake is strongly
felt in modem courts, as the Kremlick, Taff, Engle v.
Siegel, and Snide cases illustrate. Yet because the
black letter law has seemed so hostile, courts have
often given remedy in specious or unreasoned theories of decision. We think that, with the no-extrinsicevidence rule now undergoing abrogation and with
the Wills Act formal requirements understood to be
not an obstacle, a principled reformation doctrine can
be formulated that will strike the proper balance
between the concerns that underlie the old no-reformation rule and the factors that have made that rule
ever more unpalatable.
The reformation doctrine will exhibit considerable
simplicity. The three elements of the doctrine,
already to be observed in the reformation doctrine for
non-probate transfers, we label the (1)materiality,
(2) particularity, and (3) burden-of-proof requirements. Each is directly responsive to the evidentiary
concerns that were so prominent in discussions of
the old no-reformation rule.
The materiality and particularity elements will
require that the error be shown to have affected specific terms in the will and that the mistake claim be
sufficiently circumscribed to be susceptible of proof.
The contention that "if only my aunt had understood
how much I loved her, she'd have left me more," will
not suffice to transform disappointment into mistake.
The essential safeguard for a reformation doctrine
in the law of wills is a standard of proof effective
to deal with the evidentiary concerns to which the
former no-reformation rule was addressed. Although
that rule has been found too harsh, it did respond
to the danger of false contentions that a testator now
dead made a mistake in his duly executed will. We
have said that a modern reformation doctrine for
wills must follow the law of nonprobate transfers by
placing upon the proponent of a mistake claim the
burden of proving it by evidence of exceptional quality. The clear-and-convincing-evidence standard is
pitched above the ordinary preponderance-of-the-evidence test characteristic of most civil litigation, but

below the beyond-reasonable-doubt rule of the criminal law.
In Kremlick, Taff, and Engle v . Siegel, where the noreformation rule'was avoi&ed by
that
they were "mere construction" cases, the appropriate
clear-and-convincing-evidence standard was not
articulated. One of the advantages of recognizing an
explicit reformation doctrine is that the pressure to
conceal reformation as mere construction should
largely vanish. When mistake cases can be admitted
for what they are, they can be held to the higher
standard of proof appropriate to them. Paradoxically,
therefore, abandonment of the no-reformation rule
will sometimes result in greater fidelity to those evidentiary concerns that prompted the no-reformation
rule. Experience suggests that the evidentiary policies
of the no-reformation rule would be better served
under the opposite rule.
Testation is a field in which planning values are
quite rightly viewed as paramount. Since the will
comes into effect when the testator is powerless to
change it, certainty and predictability are at least as
important here as in any field of law. If the development of a mistake doctrine were to jeopardize welldrafted instruments, the gain would surely not be
worth the cost.
Would a reformation doctrine open every estate to
the depredation of potential contestants claiming to
take under a mistakenlv rendered or mistakenlv
omitted term? There are many reasons for thinking
not. As the recent cases discussed earlier illustrate,
the real sphere for relief against mistake has been in
cases of deficient lawyering. The Taff case could not
have arisen if counsel had worded the will to speak
of "my natural heirs." In Engle v. Siegel, routine good
drafting would have provided a further disposition
for the contingency that one of the testators' mothers
predeceased them. In Snide, all that the lawyer had to
do in order to prevent the mistake was to read the
first line of the document that he gave his client to
execute.
The existence of relief in these cases will not work
as a magnet for groundless claims against welldrafted wills. Existing reformation practice in contract
and conveyancing has disclosed no such problem,
and the reason seems obvious. The clear-and-convincing-evidence standard would impose too onerous
a burden of proof upon the proponent of a spurious
claim. Indeed, as we argued, the recognition of a
reformation doctrine would serve to increase the level
of safeguard in cases like Kremlick, Taff, and Engle v.
Siege1 that are now treated as "mere construction"
ca;es without attention to the clear-and-convincingevidence standard. It is far better to operate an honest reformation doctrine that relieves the pressure for
subterfuge and sets an appropriate test for relief.
We should emphasize that, not only will the reformation doctrine have negligible effect upon welldrafted instruments, it will also not encourage draftsmen to become slovenly. Precisely because the

reformation doctrine is a rule of litigation, no draftsman would plan to rely on it when proper drafting
can spare the expense and hazard of litigation. Every
incentive to good drafting would remain.
A special characteristic of the proofs in the typical
mistake case is that the testimony of the scrivener
who made the mistake is frequently the predominant
piece of evidence. On first impression this is a disturbing factor. We can imagine a duplicitous
draftsman conniving with an interested contestant
after the testator's death and testifying to a supposed
mistake of which the draftsman has sole knowledge.
Reflection will show why this danger is remote and
why it has not figured in those areas of the law
where analogous mistakes have been remedied-the
"mere construction" cases in testation and the reformation cases in contract and conveyance that involve
instruments uttered by persons now deceased. A
lawyer-draftsman has strong disincentives to plead
his own slovenliness: It is not exactly a businessgetter, it is costly in professional esteem, it may give
rise to malpractice liability, and in extreme cases it
can lead to professional discipline. Normally, therefore, the opposite danger is the serious one-that the
lawyer will conceal his blunder.

Malpractice Liabddy
Because the error in many mistake cases is sufficiently egregious that a victim might be able to
invoke the malpractice liability of the lawyer-draftsman if relief for mistake were denied, the argument
can be made that the malpractice remedy makes relief
for mistake unnecessary. We think that there are a
variety of responses to this contention.
Initially, we note that there is a range of mistake
cases that fall outside the scope of malpractice relief,
including homedrawn wills and those lawyer-drafted
wills where for whatever reason the mistake does
not rise to the level of malpractice. Furthermore, in a
considerable fraction of lawyer malpractice cases,
the draftsman may be wholly or partially judgmentproof, as when he is long since deceased, or when he
is uninsured or underinsured.
More fundamentally, the change in theory from
devise to tort raises a serious problem of unjust
enrichment. Whereas most forms of malpractice
inflict deadweight loss that can only be put right by
compensation, in these testamentary mistake cases
a benefit is being transferred from the intended beneficiary to a mistaken devisee. That devisee is a
volunteer lacking any claim of entitlement or justified
reliance. The malpractice solution would leave the
benefit where it fortuitously fell, thereby creating a

needless loss to be charged against the draftsman (or
his insurer). So long as the draftsman's error was
innocent (which is what distinguishes mistake from
fraud), there is no reason to exaggerate his liability in
this way. If, on the other hand, the lawyer were
charged with the malpractice but subrogated to the
tort plaintiff's mistake claim, the reformation doctrine
would simply be recognized in a circular and more
litigious fashion.
We do not mean to say that negligent draftsmen
will be immune from malpractice liability in testamentary mistake cases. When the malpractice causes
true loss, that loss should be compensable. One such
item of compensable loss may be the reasonable litigation expenses of the parties to the reformation (or
other) proceeding occasioned by the mistake. We can
also imagine circumstances in which a mistake might
come to light after distribution and dissipation of
the mistakenly devised property; here the change of
position of the mistaken devisee would constitute
justified reliance and require that the intended beneficiary be remitted to his malpractice remedy.

So long as it is human to err, instances of mistaken
terms in wills are inevitable. The impulse to remedy
these errors in order to prevent unjust enrichment
is also deeply rooted in our sense of justice, which is
why the simplistic rule forbidding relief against mistake is dissolving. With the barriers to the receipt
of extrinsic evidence coming down, and with theories
now developed for overcoming the unattested language problem, courts will be presented with mistake
cases ever more persistently.
To be sure, business as usual can continue. The
courts can go on manipulating supposed rules of

construction, and they can make more exceptions. We
think that a principled reformation doctrine has all
the advantages over the patchwork of inconsistency
and injustice that characterize the present law. The
purposes of the discredited no-reformation rule will
be better served under an explicit reformation
doctrine that puts mistake cases to the test of an
appropriate standard of proof.
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